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NOTES
A Fool’s Errand
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT BUT NOT SECTION 4’S COVERAGE
FORMULA
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has taken a scalpel to the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) and what remains is a ghost of the landmark
legislation passed in 1965. Specifically, Shelby County v. Holder
found the coverage formula of Section 4 of the VRA1
unconstitutional.2 This ruling spells the end for the preclearance
regime of the VRA, under which certain state and local
governments, determined by Section 4’s coverage formula, were
required to seek Department of Justice (DOJ) approval of any
changes to their voting laws or procedures.3 In doing so, the Court
restricted Congress’s power to make determinations of how best
to protect minority voters under the Fifteenth Amendment.
The VRA, at its enactment, was a remarkable exercise of
Congressional power because of its prophylactic nature. By
requiring jurisdictions with a track record of discriminatory
voting laws to seek DOJ approval before implementing new
voting laws and procedures, the VRA placed the burden on state
and local governments to prove “that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race.”4 In the aftermath of Shelby County,
1 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012).
2 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
3 From Selma to Shelby County: Working Together to Restore the Protections
of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 1-2 (2013)
(testimony of Wendy R. Weiser, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/VRA_Testimony_071713.pdf.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (emphasis added).
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however, the preclearance mechanism is an empty vessel. What
remains, then, to protect minority voting rights is litigation
brought under the VRA. Section 2 of the VRA provides the DOJ
and citizens a cause of action against state and local acts or
procedures that adversely impact minority voters.5 Litigation,
however, is a poor substitute for preclearance. Section 2 suits,
typically, will only be resolved after potentially discriminatory
voting practices take effect.6 Such an after-the-fact remedy leaves
minority voters vulnerable to illegal voting schemes—where
discriminatory instruments that are later found unconstitutional
were in place for at least one election cycle.7 If states and localities
still seek to disenfranchise or burden minority populations,8
Congress must provide a statutory mechanism to avoid the
irreparable harm suffered by minority populations from an illegal
election, however remote the possibility.
This note will argue that the Court’s request for Congress
to amend the preclearance formula of Section 4 is a fool’s errand.
By preserving Section 5, the provision that grants the DOJ and
courts the power to pre-clear voting changes, and striking down
Section 4’s coverage formula, the Court has given the illusion
that its opinion is one of judicial minimalism.9 Cloaked in
language of restraint, the Shelby County decision is actually a
radical departure from how the Court reviews Congress’s power
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. It is not clear, then, that
reviving Section 4’s formula is a constitutionally viable avenue.
Accordingly, Congress must focus on a more tangible solution,
like lowering the burden of proof on plaintiffs seeking
preliminary injunctions in voting-rights litigation. Part I
explains the doctrinal history of the VRA and why Shelby
County’s new doctrine of “equal sovereignty” acts as a trigger for
the Court to review any proposed coverage formulas under some
form of heightened scrutiny. As any formula that treats States
differently necessarily burdens the equal sovereignty of the
states, any new formula will be subjected to heightened
scrutiny. Part II will examine various proposed amendments to
the coverage formula to show that there is no new formula
Congress can develop that will comport with the Constitutional
tests for Congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment.
5 Id. § 1973.
6 See infra Part I.E.
7 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., id. at 2639-40.
9 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of
Minimalism, 22 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014).
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Because the possibility of devising a new formula that survives
constitutional scrutiny is remote, Part III proposes guiding
principles for a statutory scheme that strengthens the Court’s
ability to grant preliminary equitable remedies in VRA litigation
that is similar to recent proposals made in Congress. Such a
remedy is necessary to prevent the constitutionally repugnant
outcome of an illegal voting scheme while accepting the reality
that a Section 2, litigation-based strategy is, at present, the most
pragmatic avenue for enforcing what remains of the VRA.
I. THEORIGINS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
LANDSCAPE AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
The Shelby County decision is, at the very least, a
departure from the Court’s demonstrated deference to Congress
to defend voting rights under its Fifteenth Amendment power.10
What results is a new constitutional landscape for state and
local governments as well as for advocates of minority voters.
This section will explain the decision and its implications,
namely what I term the new heightened scrutiny of the Court’s
equal sovereignty standard. I will then argue that the VRA is
still necessary to protect minority voters, particularly in regard
to the potential for irreparable harm to minority populations by
illegal voting schemes.
A. The Voting Rights Act and Shelby County’s Impact
The novel approach in the VRA to voter protection is its
preclearance mechanism. Because of difficulties with jurisdictions
circumventing remedial Congressional actions to protect voting
rights and the general inefficiency of targeting specific
discriminatory voting laws, Congress instituted the preclearance
regime.11 Section 5 of the VRA12 requires certain jurisdictions to
submit proposed changes to their voting laws to the DOJ, a process
called “preclearance.”13 The DOJ then has 60 days to respond.14 If
the DOJ objects to the change and blocks its implementation, then
the jurisdiction has recourse to a three-judge panel of the D.C.
District Court.15 In order to be subject to Section 5’s preclearance
10 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2637-38.
11 Id. at 2633-34.
12 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2012).
13 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2634.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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requirements, a jurisdiction must fall under the criteria laid out in
the coverage formula of Section 4.16 That formula captures:
any State or . . . any political subdivision of a State which (1) the
Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any
test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of
voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or
that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the
presidential election of November 1964.17
Congress later updated the formula to capture
jurisdictions that met the same criteria—the presence of “tests
or devices” and low minority turnout—in 1972.18 Congress did
not intend for Section 5, which covered primarily Southern
states, to be permanent but rather for the nation to take stock
of the progress made in minority voter participation when, the
Act expired.19 The VRA continued to be renewed and is still on
the books today. After Shelby County, however, no jurisdiction
can be captured by Section 4’s coverage formula, rendering
Section 5 effectively useless.20
Though many complaints have been lodged at the
Court’s decision in Shelby County, it cannot be said that it
came as a surprise.21 The Court’s 2009 decision in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO) foreshadowed the outcome of Shelby County
when it called into question the continued constitutionality of
Section 5 and thus of the preclearance regime.22 In dictum, the
Court noted that “[the VRA] imposes current burdens and must
be justified by current needs”23 and that “[t]here is also a
‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the
States”24 that is burdened by the application of Section 4. While
16 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
17 Id.
18 Id. “Test or device” is defined in the statute to identify voting barriers, like
character or literacy tests. See id. § 1973b(c).
19 Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act,
117 YALE L.J. 174, 177 (2007).
20 The one exception is for jurisdictions that are subject to preclearance by
the courts pursuant to Section 3(c), also known as the “bail-in” mechanism. See
generally Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger
Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010).
21 Id. at 1994; Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State
Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 24 (2013).
22 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)
[hereinafter NAMUDNO]; Crum, supra note 20, at 1994.
23 NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203.
24 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (quoting NAMUDNO,
557 U.S. at 203).
2014] A FOOL'S ERRAND 227
not explicitly stated, the Court signaled to Congress that
Sections 4 and 5, without amendment, would not withstand
constitutional scrutiny in perpetuity.25
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Shelby County picks up
where NAMUDNO left off. Noting “parity” in minority turnout
rates and voter registration, increased minority representation
in elected office, and a general change in circumstances from
the racial conditions of 1965,26 Chief Justice Roberts, on behalf
of the Court’s five-justice majority, found the coverage formula
unconstitutional.27 The Court declared that the formula had
outlived its utility, and was no longer “sufficiently related” to
the current conditions of minority voting discrimination.28 The
Court left observers to make sense of the constitutional
implications of its decision on the future of Congressional
power to prevent voter discrimination.
B. VRA Jurisprudence Prior to Shelby County
Until Shelby County, the Court’s standard of review for
Congress’s power to institute preclearance pursuant to the
Fifteenth Amendment was laid out in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, which established that, “As against the reserved
powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination
in voting.”29 NAMUDNO both called into doubt and left open the
question of what standard of review the Court should use in
determining the constitutionality of Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment power.30 Specifically, the Court openly queried
whether the “congruent and proportional” standard of City of
Boerne v. Flores (“Boerne”), a limiting doctrine on prophylactic
Congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, applied to Congress’s enforcement power under
25 Crum, supra note 20, at 1996; see also Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631
(“Congress could have updated the coverage formula . . . but did not do so.”).
26 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202).
27 Id. at 2631.
28 Id. at 2630 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203).
29 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (emphasis added);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
30 Richard L. Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future
Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-
jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race/.
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the Fifteenth Amendment.31 Besides NAMUDNO, though, the
precedent of Katzenbach was clear: the Court would use a
deferential standard of review of Congressional power to pass
the VRA under the rational basis test.32
After NAMUDNO, it was not clear whether the Court’s
decision to curb Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power33 would similarly apply to Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
power.34 When Congress renewed the VRA in 2006, it was
concerned with the impact of Boerne, which established the
congruence and proportionality test of Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power after the VRA’s 1981 reauthorization, on
the future constitutionality of the VRA. Boerne’s congruence
and proportionality test requires that Congress must show
congruence between the means it uses and the ends it targets, as
well as the appropriateness of the remedy it chooses, when a law
it passes pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment burdens state
sovereignty.35 The Boerne standard, though, does not delineate
what evidence specifically would be relevant to the Court’s
decision of whether a Congressional action was congruent and
proportional to a constitutional harm. Congress erred on the side
of caution and elected to keep the coverage formula, with its old
criteria as it was, because the formula had survived scrutiny
under Boerne in the past.36
C. The Standard of Review in Shelby County
Boerne, however, is not cited in the majority’s opinion in
Shelby County.37 Despite ample briefing by the parties and
significant time dedicated to the issue at oral argument, the
Supreme Court failed to address which standard of review it
would use in reviewing the preclearance formula of Section 4.38
In the absence of a clearly articulated standard—both the
language used by the majority and the depth in which the
31 Id. The “congruent and proportional” standard is discussed more in detail
later in this section.
32 Id.
33 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
34 Hasen, supra note 30 (Professor Hasen speculates a tangential but
interesting idea that a future case about Fifteenth Amendment power may cite to
NAMUDNO and Shelby County’s first footnote to establish that the “congruence and
proportionality” test also applies to the Fifteenth Amendment).
35 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-34.
36 Persily, supra note 19, at 194.
37 Hasen, supra note 30; see generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013).
38 Hasen, supra note 9, at 727.
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formula is analyzed—it is clear that the Court has adopted a
new standard of some form of heightened-scrutiny in the
context of the VRA.
The Shelby County opinion is now cited for “the
principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”39 Although
Justice Ginsburg laments the majority’s failure to identify a
standard of review,40 one can make the argument that the
majority functionally adopted the principle that a law
burdening the equal sovereignty of the states will be reviewed
under heightened scrutiny. While ample criticism has been
leveled at the pedigree of this new doctrine,41 the doctrine itself
remains and its implication is clear: the equal sovereignty
doctrine is a restriction on Congressional enforcement power.
This realization is troubling to legislators charged with
the task of drafting a new formula that comports with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. While the Shelby County
opinion may employ language that suggests it reviewed the
2006 reauthorization of the VRA under a rational basis
framework, the “equal sovereignty” principle at the heart of the
majority’s opinion is, functionally, a trigger for heightened
scrutiny. I use heightened scrutiny to indicate a level of
scrutiny beyond rational basis, not necessarily to indicate a
specific level of the tiers of scrutiny. Whether intermediate42 or
heightened scrutiny,43 the Court undertakes an exacting
examination of the decisions Congress makes when it singles
out a suspect class. In that sense, the opinion can be read to
mean that when Congress distinguishes between states in a
way that burdens their sovereignty, statehood will be treated
as a suspect classification.
The language of the Shelby County opinion, despite its
conspicuous silence, points to a standard of review beyond
rational basis. Revealingly, the opinion borrows language
germane to heightened scrutiny review. Though the majority
cites South Carolina v. Katzenbach,44 the case that established
the more deferential, rational basis review of Congress’s power
39 Shelby Cnty. 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
40 Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2649; Hon. Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Ruling Is About the
Conservative Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_
supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html.
42 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
44 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 333 U.S. 301 (1966).
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to enact the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment,45 it
simultaneously describes the preclearance remedy in terms of
how it is “tailored” to resolve a constitutional harm.46 The
tailored language suggests a new, more exacting standard of
review than that of Katzenbach, drawing from the
Constitutional lexicon of the heightened scrutiny doctrine that
examines the extent to which Congress’s acts are narrowly
tailored to its ends.47
Similarly, the majority continued to impute heightened
scrutiny language into Katzenbach’s rational basis standard.
The Court adopted NAMUDNO’s language that “a statute’s
‘disparate geographic coverage’ . . . be ‘sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets,’”48 clearly employing heightened
scrutiny review. The Court then concludes with an explicit
reference to the rational basis test, writing that “[i]t would
have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between
States” if the Act had been newly passed, as opposed to
reauthorized, based on the data it used in 2006.49 Despite the
Court’s oscillation between the tiers of scrutiny and the
resulting confusion for policymakers and advocates,50 the Court
continually relies on heightened scrutiny as the basis for its
finding that the coverage formula is unconstitutional.
That the Court could not have found the coverage
formula unconstitutional under rational basis review is noted
by the dissent. Justice Ginsburg makes clear that under the
rational basis test of Katzenbach, there is no question that the
Section 4 formula in its current form would pass constitutional
muster.51 “So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote
free from racial discrimination, we ask not whether Congress
has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has
rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate end.”52
The Court, tellingly, undergoes a meticulous investigation into
the means Congress chose to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. The investigation itself, then, goes beyond merely
determining whether Congress thought the formula to be
appropriate, a departure from a rational basis examination.
45 See Hasen, supra note 9, at 716.
46 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
47 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
48 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting NAMUDNO v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009)).
49 Id. at 2630-31 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 2637-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 2637.
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Another limitation on Congress’s enforcement power,
indicative of some form of heightened scrutiny, is Shelby
County’s “current conditions” standard. As part of the Court’s
holding, it requires that, “Congress—if it is to divide the
States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a
basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot
rely simply on the past.”53 The “current conditions” requirement
will limit the evidence that Congress can use to show it has a
legitimate interest in enacting prophylactic measures under the
Fifteenth Amendment because it adds an additional
qualification that did not exist under Katzenbach—that the
evidence must be current. The Court is taking the question of
when evidence of voter discrimination is relevant away from
Congress. That is a departure from the deference of rational
basis. The nebulous standard of “current conditions” gives courts
the power to answer that question, though it is not clear if it is a
factual or legal issue. Unfortunately, the Court fails to articulate
what evidence, if any, would meet its new standards.
Consequently, after Shelby County, an act of Congress
that burdens the equal sovereignty of the States will trigger
heightened scrutiny. This is essentially what the NAMUDNO
decision called for in the absence of a revised coverage
formula.54 If the question after Shelby County is whether
Congress’s remedy is “sufficiently related” to a constitutional
harm,55 then the implications may be dire. As Justice Ginsburg
notes in her dissent, many federal programs treat states
differently, for instance, in regards to gambling, EPA
regulations, Nevada’s Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site, and
allocation of aid to rural drug enforcement.56 In a Court
resistant to expand the tiers of scrutiny, the sovereignty of
states may have found itself among race and gender as
classifications that require the Court’s heightened scrutiny.57
53 Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
54 Price, supra note 21, at 26.
55 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting NAMUDNO v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009)).
56 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57 The equal sovereignty doctrine is, at best, judicial invention. It is doctrinally
dishonest inasmuch as it asserts dicta in NAMUDNO as settled law. See id. (“In today’s
decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing
breadth to the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of Katzenbach.”). In
addition, the underpinnings of the equal sovereignty doctrine fails to support its
application in Shelby County in two ways. First, it misappropriates the equal footing
doctrine that provides the constitutional purchase for the majority’s argument. Prior to
the Shelby County decision, the equal sovereignty doctrine solely applied to “the
admission of new States.” Id. at 2649. Second, it ignores the historical reality of the
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Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
may be further limited by the congruence and proportionality
test. The Court has previously analogized Congressional
enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.58 Accordingly, Boerne’s limits may soon apply to
the VRA.59 Professor Hasen describes how a future Court could
“cite to NAMUDNO and Shelby County fn. 1 for the proposition
that the Court has held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
[A]mendment standards are the same, and then bootstrap[]the
Boerne standard into a Fifteenth Amendment case.”60 That
would mean that to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress would have to find evidence of “intentional
unconstitutional discrimination by the states.”61 As such, the
congruence and proportionality concerns of Boerne cannot be
divorced from Congress considering its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement power in the future and whatever amendments, if
any, it can make to the VRA.
What follows is a landscape nearly impossible for
Congress to navigate. The dual requirement that a formula for
preclearance that burdens the “equal sovereignty” of the states
must be justified by “current conditions” that warrant
proportional remedies may preclude Congress from ever
divining a formula at all.62 In this sense, the Court has sent
Congress on a fool’s errand; no formula exists that comports
with the Court’s constitutional mandate in Shelby County.
D. The Continued Need for VRA Protections
That the VRA has outlived its utility is far from settled.
Congress undertook an extensive investigation in 2006 that
made clear that current conditions justified the continued need
Reconstruction Amendments like the Fifteenth Amendment: that the Amendments were
targeted at specific states, burdening their sovereignty, to remedy specific problems of
voter discrimination. For a comprehensive and truly enlightening survey of the historical
context surrounding the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and how that informed the
preclearance system under the VRA, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of
Section 5 – and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109 (2013).
58 Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennesee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178-
79 (2005) (citing Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001)).
59 Hasen, supra note 30.
60 Id.
61 Hasen, supra note 58, at 179.
62 Hasen, supra note 9, at 737.
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for the VRA.63 The congressional record amassed during the
reauthorization was an unparalleled legislative body of
evidence of minority voter discrimination.64 While the majority
found that current conditions in the Congressional record did
not justify the extraordinary measures of preclearance, there is
ample evidence of contemporary racial discrimination to
support the continued need for the VRA.
Up until the Court’s decision in Shelby County, the DOJ
continued to use the VRA’s Section 5 preclearance power to
block discriminatory voting practices. Between 1982 and 2006,
the DOJ objected to over 700 proposed voting changes.65
Though overall DOJ objections under Section 5 to state and
local acts have decreased since the mid-1990s,66 the threat of
voter discrimination persists. The data reveal evidence of the
continued concerns of voter discrimination facing minority
populations. For instance, “in the Deep South . . . African
Americans make up 35% of the population,” yet constitute “only
20.7% of seats in state legislatures—with even less” success for
minorities in statewide office.67 More specifically, Justice
Ginsburg, in her dissent, singles out a few anecdotes in
Congressional findings that demonstrate continuing efforts in
the last twenty years to marginalize minority participation in
elections. Some examples include Mississippi seeking to
“reenact a dual voter registration system” that had previously
been used to “disenfranchise Black voters”; voter dilution in
redistricting plans in the City of Albany, Georgia and in Texas;
purging of voter rolls of black voters in Alabama; and an all-
white Town Board in Mississippi “abruptly cancel[ling] the
town’s election after an ‘unprecedented number’ of African-
American candidates announced they were running for office.”68
These troubling facts point to the continued need for strong
protections for minority voters in previously covered
jurisdictions, especially because these acts were taken despite
the threat of federal preclearance.
It is hard to quantify the success of the VRA because of
its deterrent effect on jurisdictions that, if not for the threat of
63 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see generally Persily, supra note 19, at 174.
64 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2652.
65 Id. at 2639.
66 Persily, supra note 19, at 199.
67 Id. at 198. The Deep South refers to Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Id.
68 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (internal quotations omitted).
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preclearance, would have enacted discriminatory voting laws.69
Along similar lines, the DOJ had the ability to use a
preclearance objection as an ex-ante bargaining chip.70
Previously, the DOJ could request additional information from
a jurisdiction that had proposed a potentially discriminatory
change to its election procedures. By doing so the DOJ elicited
concessions including the modification or withdrawal of
proposed discriminatory measures by states and localities
before the proposal took effect.71 For instance, “more than 800
proposed changes were altered or withdrawn since the last
reauthorization [of the VRA] in 1982” after the DOJ had
requested more information from states and localities.72 In fact,
during the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, Congress was
concerned that it would be hard to quantify Section 5’s
deterrent effect in establishing the factual record.73 With
Section 5 rendered inoperative, previously covered jurisdictions
have a greater ability to enact discriminatory election laws
putting minority voters at risk.
In the current political climate, states and localities also
have greater incentives to discriminate against minority voters.
Since the most recent party realignment following the civil rights
era, there is more racial polarization in the two major political
parties, where “most African American voters are Democrats and
most white conservative voters are Republicans.”74 Republican
incumbents, accordingly, have an incentive to disenfranchise
minorities under the guise of partisan politics.75 Without the DOJ
to object, it is reasonable to expect state and local governments to
enact partisan-infused restrictive voting measures that target
voters based on their race.
In the months following the Shelby County decision,
some policymakers have done just that. Since 2010, 22 states
have introduced voting restriction measures, including voter
identification laws (Voter ID), purging of voter rolls, and ballot
69 Persily, supra note 19, at 200-01.
70 Id.
71 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639; Persily, supra note 19 at 200.
72 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639; see also Persily, supra note 19 at 200.
73 Persily, supra note 19 at 193-94 (“To prove the law was necessary, the
best evidence would be data concerning the extent of voting rights violations in the
covered jurisdictions . . . . However, if the Act was working well, then few such
examples should exist.”).
74 Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 61 (2014).
75 Id. at 62.
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access measures.76 In 2014, residents of 15 of those states faced
the new wave of restrictive voting measures for the first time in
a federal election.77 This is in no small part because the
Supreme Court was quick to implement its Shelby County
decision to pending voting rights cases. Just two days after its
decision in Shelby County, the Court vacated the D.C. District
Court’s finding, after an appeal from an objection by the DOJ
under preclearance, that a Texas re-districting plan violated
the VRA because it had a retrogressive effect on the minority
makeup of voting districts.78 The new post-Shelby landscape is
clear. Recent state enactments from previously covered
jurisdictions, like the restrictive Voter ID laws passed in Texas
and North Carolina,79 signal that the threat to minority voting
rights is still real and the issue is likely to be before the Court
soon. The current fallout from Shelby County may be the most
convincing proof of Section 5’s continued need.
E. The Danger of Illegal Voting Schemes
Section 2 litigation is an inadequate substitute for
preclearance because it exposes minority voters to illegal voting
schemes. Illegal voting schemes are policies enacted by state or
local jurisdictions that are found unconstitutional only after
the occurrence of an election cycle. Justice Ginsburg
highlighted this problem in her Shelby County dissent.
Congress also received evidence that litigation under § 2 of the VRA was
an inadequate substitute for preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.
Litigation occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme has
already been put in place and individuals have been elected pursuant to
it, thereby gaining the advantages of incumbency. An illegal scheme
76 ERIN FERNS LEE, PROJECT VOTE, ELECTION LEGISLATION 2013:
LEGISLATIVE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1-12 (2013), available at
http://www.projectvote.org/images/publications/Threats%20and%20Opportunities/Septem
ber%202013/ELECTION-LEGISLATION-2013-Threats-and-Opportunities-September-
2013.pdf; WENDY WEISER & ERIK OPSAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STATE OF
VOTING IN 2014 1 (2014), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/analysis/State_of_Voting_2014.pdf.
77 WEISER, supra note 76, at 1.
78 Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated,
133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013).
79 Lyle Denniston, Texas Moves to Protect Voter ID Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
8, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/texas-moves-to-protect-voter-id-
law/; Richard L. Hasen, North Carolina’s New Voter Suppression Law Shows Why the
Voting Rights Act Is Still Necessary, SLATE (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:08 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/north_carolina_
s_speedy_vote_suppression_tactics_show_exactly_why_the_voting.html.
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might be in place for several election cycles before a § 2 plaintiff can
gather sufficient evidence to challenge it.80
Post-facto litigation presents obstacles to disenfranchised
minority voters seeking recourse through the courts. The slow-
pace of litigation81 and the reluctance of courts to grant
preliminary injunctions in Section 2 cases,82 mean that an illegal
voting scheme, one that would have faced a preclearance
objection by the DOJ, may cause irreparable harm to minority
voters even if a lawsuit challenging the scheme as
unconstitutional is eventually successful. The evidentiary hurdle
that Justice Ginsburg describes is also substantial because the
burden of proof falls to the voter rather than the jurisdiction.
There are scenarios where the harm to minority voters, while
difficult to prove, is very much real. It is possible, for instance,
that “a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy its burden under
Section 2 even though, on the same facts, a jurisdiction would
have been unable to meet its burden under Section 5.”83
Section 2 litigation, because of its complexity, takes much
longer to litigate than in other areas of the law. This is another
reason why Section 2 litigation is a poor substitute for
preclearance and why illegal voting schemes may proliferate
after the Shelby County decision. In a rare moment of
consensus, both the majority and the dissent in Shelby County
discuss the slow and costly nature of litigating VRA claims.84
This was also of concern to the majority in Katzenbach, who
wrote, “Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare,
sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent
combing through registration records in preparation for trial.
Litigation has been exceedingly slow.”85 Thus, the temporal
aspect of Section 2 litigation presents its own problems as an
effective remedy for minority voters.
More importantly, the harm faced by minority voters by
illegal voting schemes is irreparable.86 Incumbents elected
80 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2640 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 2633-34.
82 See infra Part III.A.
83 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 55, 57-58 (2013).
84 Shelby Cnty.,133 S. Ct. at 2619 (noting that “slow and expensive” litigation
was the impetus for the passing of the VRA); id. at 2633-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) (citation omitted).
86 From Selma to Shelby County: Working Together to Restore the Protections
of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 108
(2013) (testimony of Justin Levitt, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles,
in response to questions submitted by Sen. Al Franken), available at
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under unconstitutional conditions have the power to enact
policies that entrench their own power such as passing
additional discriminatory voting mechanisms.87 The
repercussions, then, of a discriminatory election law cannot be
remedied by invalidating the law itself. A preventative remedy
is necessary to avert such harms.
There are some examples of illegal voting schemes in
practice. Because preclearance prevented instances of illegal
voting schemes in covered jurisdictions, the only examples of
these schemes are in jurisdictions not covered by the coverage
formula in the 2006 reauthorization. In one case, a
redistricting plan was enjoined in 2004 because it was found
unconstitutional, despite that a complaint was filed in 2002.88
During that two-year gap, an election cycle occurred under
unconstitutional conditions and incumbents ran in the 2004
elections.89 Another example is a redistricting plan in South
Dakota. A complaint was filed in December 2001 alleging the
plan to be unconstitutional, the plan was found
unconstitutional in September 2004, and a remedial plan was
not imposed until 2005.90 As the case was litigated, the
discriminatory plan was in effect for elections in 2002 and
2004.91 It is likely that these instances will expand to
previously covered jurisdictions where emboldened state and
local governments may undertake brash measures to enact
voting restrictions without the threat of preclearance objection.
For instance, the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit’s stay
of a permanent injunction against Texas’s Voter ID law
granted by a district court in Texas after finding that the law
violated Section 2 of the VRA.92 Minority voters, as a result,
faced election procedures in November 2014 that had already
been found unconstitutional by a federal court. Unfortunately,
the problem posed to minority voters after Shelby County is
much easier to identify than its solution.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg88717/pdf/CHRG-113shrg88717.pdf
[hereinafter Levitt Testimony].
87 Id.
88 Id. at 106.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 106-07.
91 Id.
92 Veasey v. Perry, Nos. 14A393, 14A402 and 14A404, slip op. at 1, 4 (U.S.
Oct. 18, 2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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II. THEDIFFICULTIES INDEVISING ANEW SECTION 4
FORMULA
Even in 2006, Congress was uncertain that it could
devise a formula that would withstand a challenge under
Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test.93 With Shelby
County’s more stringent constitutional guidelines for
acceptable coverage formulas, legislators face even more
uncertainty. Shelby County requires that legislators discern
which facts constitute proof of current conditions of minority
voter discrimination.94 “Subtler second-generation” voting
barriers, though, render the original metrics of the VRA’s
coverage formula, such as voter registration rates, inadequate
to address minority disenfranchisement in its current form.95
Evidence shows that minority voter registration and turnout is
not as telling of discrimination as it was in 1965.96 While some
members of Congress have proposed a bill to revive the
coverage formula of the VRA,97 there has been little more than
that.98 Through analyzing the proposed Voting Rights
Amendment Act (“VRAA”) as well as an alternative method
proposed by two academics that captures state and local
jurisdictions whose constituents harbor racist attitudes, it is
evident that no coverage formula can survive the heightened
scrutiny review of Shelby County’s equal sovereignty doctrine.
That is, a new coverage formula must not burden the equal
sovereignty of the states, but if it does, it must be justified by
current conditions.99
The characterization, then, of Congress’s task of
updating the formula to reflect current conditions as an easy
fix100 is misguided. First, I will examine the elements of the
93 See supra Part I.B.
94 Persily, supra note 19, at 193-94.
95 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96 Persily, supra note 19, at 196-97.
97 Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014)
available at https://beta.congress.gov/113/bills/s1945/BILLS-113s1945is.pdf; Carrie
Johnson, Lawmakers Roll Out Voting Rights Act Fix, NPR.ORG (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:52 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/01/16/263113258/lawmakers-roll-out-voting-
rights-act-fix.
98 Kate Nocera, Judiciary Chairman in No Rush to Move on Voting Rights
Act Bill, BUZZFEEDNEWS (June 26, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
katenocera/judiciary-chairman-in-no-rush-to-move-on-voting-rights-act-r#3ufaag3.
99 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
100 See Joshua Thompson, Shelby County v. Holder: Forget the Coverage
Formula, What About the Effects Test? SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 12, 2013, 1:29 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holderforget-the-coverage-formula-
what-about-the-effects-test/.
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VRAA with specific attention to its proposed coverage formula.
Second, I will look at a novel academic approach to a new
Section 4 formula that captures jurisdictions where large
amounts of voters express racist beliefs.101 Though both answer
the Court’s call to base a new formula on current conditions of
voter discrimination, they both face serious concerns after
Shelby County that raise questions about the constitutional
vitality of any future Section 4 formula.
A. The Proposals in the VRAA
The VRAA, proposed in January 2014, aims to fortify
what remains of the VRA’s power to protect minority voters
from discrimination. There are four main proposals relevant to
answering the problem of illegal elections.102 First, the VRAA
expands the power to “bail-in” jurisdictions under Section 3(c)
of the VRA.103 Second, to update the VRA’s formula to capture
state and local jurisdictions.104 Third, to create a requirement
for state and local jurisdictions to notify voters of changes
within 180 days of federal elections, changes in polling
resources related to federal elections, and changes in voting
districts, like redistricting, in federal, state, and local
elections.105 Fourth, to expand the power of courts to grant
preliminary injunctive relief in VRA litigation.106 While some of
the proposals above present good working alternatives to the
world without an effective preclearance regime, the inclusion of
a new coverage formula that burdens the equal sovereignty of
states will hamper the effort to pass the VRAA.
B. The Coverage Formula in the VRAA is Unconstitutional
The proposed coverage formula in the VRAA seeks to
capture States and political subdivisions whose practices reflect
current conditions of race-based voter discrimination.107 States
would be subject to pre-clearance if, in the last 15 years, a state
101 See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The
Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance
after Shelby County, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262954.
102 See S. 1945.
103 Id. at § 2. “Bail-in” is discussed in detail later, infra Part II.D.
104 S. 1945 § 3.
105 Id. at § 4.
106 Id. at § 6.
107 Id. at § 4.
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or a political subdivision within it committed five voting
violations and at least one of the violations was committed by
the state itself.108 A political subdivision, on the other hand,
would be subject to preclearance if, in the last 15 years, either it
committed three voting violations or, if the political subdivision
has “persistent and extremely low minority voter turnout,” it
commits only one violation.109 If captured, a jurisdiction would be
subject to preclearance for 10 years, unless prior to then it
obtains a “bail-out” under Section 4(a) of the VRA.110
The details of what constitutes voting rights’ violations
and low minority turnout are further explicated in the
language of the proposed amendment. Voting rights violations
include findings of Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment
violations or federal voting laws, a “failure or denial of pre-
clearance by a court under Section 5 or 3(c) of the VRA,” or the
same “failure or denial of pre-clearance by the Attorney
General.”111 However, there are explicit exemptions in the
statute for voting rights violations based on Voter ID laws.112
Furthermore, “persistent, extremely low minority turnout” is
determined based on the relation of minority turnout in the
political subdivision to minority and non-minority turnout
rates over the past 15 years in the country, state, and same
political subdivision, as well as if “the average minority turnout
rate across all such elections in the political subdivision was
more than 10 percentage points below the average nonminority
turnout rate for the entire Nation.”113
Regardless of the efficacy of the legislation or good
intent of its drafters, the coverage formula poses problems
under the new doctrine of Shelby County and, if challenged,
would not survive the Court’s heightened scrutiny. It
necessarily burdens the equal sovereignty of states because, if
108 Press Release, Office of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Voting Rights Amendment Act
of 2014 Section by Section Description of VRA Draft Legislation (Jan. 16, 2014)
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/1-16-14-section-by-section_-for-press
[hereinafter VRAA Press Release].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See S. 1945; see also William Yeomans, Introduction: An Overview of the
Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
THE VOTING RIGHTS AMENDMENT ACT OF 2014: A CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO SHELBY
COUNTY 2 (2014), available at https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
Yeomans_Stephanopoulos_Chin_Bagenstos_and_Daniels_-_VRAA_1.pdf. Because voting
identification laws are the central battle ground of second-generation voting barriers, one
wonders if this clause renders the whole effort moot. See supra Part I.D.
113 S. 1945 § 3; see also VRAA Press Release, supra note 108.
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enacted, certain jurisdictions, and not others, would be subject
to preclearance. But to burden the equal sovereignty of the
states is permissible so long as it is justified by current
conditions.114 The criteria outlined in the VRAA, however, do not
capture current conditions of racial discrimination because its
metrics are arbitrary indicators of minority disenfranchisement.
A finding that a subdivision violated the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment or Section 2 of the VRA, considered a
voting violation under the VRAA’s coverage formula, is not a
good indicator of conditions of voter discrimination. Before
Shelby County, preclearance lessened the need for the DOJ or
advocates to file voting rights complaints in previously covered
jurisdictions, so evidence of successful litigation is a poor data
set to reflect current conditions of race discrimination.
Additionally, the success of equality based litigation is arbitrary,
as it is based on a variety of factors that are not necessarily
reflective of current conditions of race discrimination.115 For
instance, success may “vary . . . depending on the relative risk
aversions of plaintiffs and defendants, available legal resources,”
as well as the possibility of settlement rather than a decision on
the merits.116 Furthermore, federal courts are moving away from
equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle
to protect minority groups.117 What results is a formula that may
underwhelm voting rights advocates and, more importantly, a
formula that is underinclusive because litigation would have to
be filed against a jurisdiction in order for a discriminatory
practice to ever come to light. Therefore, the VRAA’s coverage
formula is constitutionally fatal in the new heightened scrutiny
of the equal sovereignty doctrine.
The Court may also find fault with Congress’s line
drawing, defining current conditions as events and violations
over the prior 15 years. It is not clear, moreover, how the
drafters, in developing the VRAA’s new criteria, came to five
voting violations by states and three by political subdivisions
as the thresholds beyond which jurisdictions would be subject
to preclearance. Arbitrary line drawing is a generally
acceptable tool for Congress and one that would survive a
rational-basis review by the Court. Without specific findings,
however, as to why the time-frame and number of violations in
114 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
115 Elmendorf, supra note 101 (manuscript at 10-11).
116 Id.
117 See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (2011).
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the statute’s formula are ideal indicators of current conditions
of minority voter disenfranchisement, the proposed formula
may not survive Constitutional review. Especially, in light of a
Court that is openly hostile to the idea of any legislation that
draws distinctions based on race,118 and specifically to
preclearance review of election changes,119 it is not likely that
the Justices will give Congress the benefit of the doubt. The
arbitrary metrics proposed in the VRAA do not constitutionally
justify the burden on state sovereignty that results from the
revival of the preclearance regime.
C. Preclearance Formula Based on Racist Attitudes of
Jurisdiction
An interesting proposal is to base the coverage formula
on data of racist views held by voters in a state or local
jurisdiction. Christopher Elmendorf and Douglas Spencer, who
proposed such a formula, define voter discrimination as
“expressions of preference—with respect to candidates, political
parties, or policies—which would violate the Constitution’s race
discrimination norms if the voter were a state actor and the
expression a state action.”120 It follows that a formula that
measures high concentrations of voters with discriminatory
voter preferences provides Congress with current conditions of
the potential for minority disenfranchisement that bear a
“logical” relationship to a preclearance remedy.121 Voter
discrimination would be determined by a survey that discerns
racial animus based on stereotyping by respondents.122
This formula presents an interesting contrast to the
VRAA. Rather than looking to more concrete metrics like
minority voter turnout or Section 2 violations, Elmendorf and
Spencer’s proposal seeks to show that the voters, and thus the
politicians they elect, intend to disenfranchise minority voters.
In this respect, the proposal reads the Court’s current
conditions requirement literally: racism is the best measure of
current conditions of minority discrimination and this is what
racism in America looks like. Moreover, it solves one of the key
118 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”).
119 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631-32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120 Elmendorf, supra note 101 (manuscript at 13).
121 Id.
122 Id. (manuscript at 17).
2014] A FOOL'S ERRAND 243
problems of the VRAA, which is its arbitrary line drawing. The
scientific methodology of a Section 4 formula based on the
racist attitudes of voters involves less Congressional
subjectivity and more objective measures in terms of both the
time frame and actual racial animus.123
The authors look to data aggregated in two large sample
surveys conducted in 2008: the National Annenberg Election
Survey (NAES) and the Cooperative Campaign Analysis
Project (CCAP).124 The surveys asked about 50,000 respondents
a series of questions to gauge racial attitudes. For instance, the
NAES asked respondents to rate “the work ethic,
trustworthiness, and intelligence” of their self-identifying
ethnic group, and then asked for general attitudes on
“blacks.”125 “The CCAP posed similar questions,” asking
respondents to rate on a scale of one to seven the “intelligence
and work effort” of various ethnic groups.126 Important to the
reliability of the data, the surveys were conducted
anonymously and online, where respondents would be more
candid.127 Social scientists consider these models to be valid
gauges of racial prejudice.128 For the sake of argument, I
assume that the methodology is effective in making a
statistically accurate representation of racist attitudes.
The authors propose that racial animus and inaccurate
conclusions made due to stereotypes of minority candidates
serve as the basis for determining voter discrimination.129 The
data results would be aggregated to reflect, in a sense, the most
racist states.130 The author’s policy recommendation is twofold:
First, Congress should enact a default coverage formula using our
ranking of the states by anti-black stereotyping . . . . The new
coverage formula could take into account of other factors as well,
such as racially polarized voting and minority population size, but
worse-than-ordinary racial stereotyping would be a necessary
condition for coverage. Second, Congress should give the Department
of Justice or an independent commission authority to update the
coverage formula prospectively.131
123 Cf. supra Part II.B. (describing why the coverage formula in VRAA is
too subjective).
124 Elmendorf, supra note 101 (manuscript at 22).
125 Id. (manuscript at 22-23).
126 Id. (manuscript at 23).
127 Id. (manuscript at 24-25).
128 Id. (manuscript at 23).
129 Id. (manuscript at 17).
130 Id. (manuscript at 37-39).
131 Id. (manuscript at 51).
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Such a Congressional act, however, would not survive
the Court’s new Shelby County doctrine. The formula would
subject certain states to differential treatment—preclearance
for some and not others—triggering the equal sovereignty test.
A formula that targets jurisdictions based on the racist attitudes
of its constituents, moreover, is not sufficiently related to
current conditions of race-based voter discrimination. This
proposal, in contrast to the VRAA, is focused on showing
conditions of discriminatory intent, rather than capturing
discrimination in effect.132 But without an instance of actual
discrimination a formula will likely fail constitutional scrutiny.
The underlying premise of the formula is that it is evidence of a
heightened risk of minority disenfranchisement, only a
potentiality, rather than discrimination-in-fact. A potentiality
does not reach the threshold of constitutional harm that would
be considered a current condition of voter discrimination.
Arguably, despite the intent of the authors, it would still be
difficult to prove, in litigation or Congressional hearings, a
causal link between the racist attitudes of a jurisdiction and
intentionally discriminatory policies enacted by lawmakers. In
other words, just because voters are racist does not mean that
the laws enacted restrict the right of minorities to vote. A
formula based on the degree of racism of voters in a jurisdiction,
therefore, is not sufficiently tailored to a constitutional harm,
or more specifically, tailored to remedy current conditions of
actual discrimination.
D. Section 2 Litigation and Section 3(c)’s Bail-In Approach
One alternative approach to crafting a preclearance
formula is the bail-in approach pursuant to Section 3(c) of the
VRA.133 Section 3(c) provides a mechanism for federal courts to
“bail-in” a jurisdiction, that is, to bring a state or local jurisdiction
under the preclearance supervision of the court.134 In order to bail-
in a jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a showing that a
jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of
the Constitution135 or Section 2 of the VRA. Both carry a difficult
burden for plaintiffs to meet.136
132 Id. (manuscript at 14-15, 19).
133 See Crum, supra note 20, at 1997.
134 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012).
135 Michael Ellement, Preclearance Without Statutory Change: Bail-In Suits
Post-Shelby County, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 4 (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:45 AM),
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Section 3(c) of the VRA provides the option for a court to
retain jurisdiction of a suit brought by the Attorney General
and implement the equivalent of the preclearance
requirements of Section 5.137 As such, observers have pointed to
Section 3(c) as a saving grace for a post-Shelby County
preclearance regime.138 More importantly, the DOJ requested
Section 3(c) relief in its most recent filing against Texas’s Voter
ID law,139 which suggests, absent Congressional amendment to
the VRA, that this is the last bulwark of prophylactic voter
protection offered by the VRA.
The bail-in approach, however, is inferior to Section 5 in
that, in order for a jurisdiction to be bailed-in, a plaintiff must
make a showing that an election change was motivated by
discriminatory intent rather than simply capturing a
jurisdiction for preclearance with Section 4’s coverage formula.140
While the discriminatory intent standard is a higher bar to
meet, it “is not insurmountable.”141 Some jurisdictions have been
successfully bailed-in after a showing—or admission—of
discriminatory intent.142
Still, bail-in is not sufficient to allay legitimate concerns
regarding illegal voting schemes. Litigants filing a complaint
under Section 2, as a matter of common sense, will always ask
for bail-in as a possible form of relief.143 It is still, however, a
post-facto remedy that can leave minority voters vulnerable to
disenfranchisement and the problem of illegal voting schemes
would still persist. Despite the promise of bail-in, it is ancillary
http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/preclearance-without-statutory-change-bail-suits-post-
shelby-county (click “DOWNLOAD PDF”).
136 Crum, supra note 20, at 2009 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (plurality opinion)).
137 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
138 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moving Past Section 5: More Fingers or a New
Dike?, 12 ELECTION L. J. 338 (2013). In addition, many pointed to bail-in before Shelby,
anticipating that Section 5 would be found unconstitutional. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013).
139 Complaint at 14, United States v. Texas, No. 2:13-cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22,
2013), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/justice-department-
complaint-in-texas-voter-id-lawsuit/414/.
140 See Crum, supra note 20, at 2009.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2010-15. Crum points to success in “two states, six counties, and one
city: the State of Arkansas; State of New Mexico; Los Angeles County, California;
Escambia County, Florida; Thurston County, Nebraska; Bernalillo County, New
Mexico; Buffalo County, South Dakota; Charles Mix County, South Dakota; and the
city of Chattanooga, Tennessee.” Id. at 2010 (footnotes omitted).
143 Ellement, supra note 135, at 6.
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to a more a long-term solution. In this sense, preliminary
injunctive relief will still be necessary to guard against illegal
voting schemes while advocates mount a legal challenge to bail-
in a jurisdiction that discriminates against minority voters.
Request for a preliminary injunction, moreover, may even be a
necessary component of Section 2 litigation. In its brief asking
the Court to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s stay of Texas’s Voter ID
law, the State of Texas admonished plaintiffs for failing to
request a preliminary injunction in August 2013 when the suit
was filed.144 The Court then agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s
concerns of changing election procedures in close proximity to
the election and stayed the district court’s permanent
injunction of Texas’ Voter ID law.145 This concern could have
easily been avoided had advocates requested preliminary
equitable relief earlier. Given that litigation may be the only
option for aggrieved voters, Congress must act to strengthen
the litigation approach to voter protection and ensure that no
citizen suffers the harm of an illegal voting scheme.
III. PROPOSED STATUTORY REMEDY
A. Preliminary Injunctions as a Means to Prevent Illegal
Voting Schemes from Taking Effect
The most startling problem of a Section 2, litigation-
based approach, in the wake of Shelby County, is the harm
posed by illegal voting schemes.146 Even if a policy, through
Section 2 litigation, is proven to be unconstitutional, the harm to
disenfranchised voters has been done and incumbents will have
been voted into office under constitutionally troubling
circumstances.147 The courts, however, have the equitable power
to prevent such a voting scheme from going into place until a
decision is made on its merits through the grant of a preliminary
injunction at the plaintiff’s request.
Because of Section 5’s prophylactic nature, there has been
no need to examine in depth the efficacy of preliminary relief in
Section 2 cases. But this remedy was not lost on the Supreme
Court in oral argument where Solicitor General Verrilli reported
144 Brief for Respondent at 57, Veasey v. Perry, Nos. 14A393, 14A402 and
14A404 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2014).
145 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Texas to Use Strict Voter ID Law in
Coming Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/19/us/supreme-court-upholds-texas-voter-id-
146 See supra Part I.E.
147 Stephanopoulos, supra note 83, at 68.
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that preliminary injunctions were granted in “fewer than one-
quarter of ultimately successful Section 2 suits.”148 Other lawyers
and academics placed the number as low as “less than 5%”149 of all
Section 2 cases or even “10 to 15” cases in total since 1982.150
Moreover, preliminary relief is only available after extensive
motion practice or discovery.151 Accordingly, injunctive relief in
VRA cases, as it stands, is not sufficient to address concerns of
illegal voting schemes.
Besides the scarcity of preliminary relief presently
available to Section 2 litigants, many other problems will vex
the DOJ, civilians, and civic groups who seek to challenge
discriminatory voting schemes with litigation. The time and
cost of litigation will stifle the number of schemes that will ever
be challenged in court.152 Additionally, in Section 2 litigation
the burden of proof falls on the challengers as opposed to it
falling on state or local governments subject to Section 5.153
If the equal sovereignty doctrine constitutionally
precludes a viable Section 4 formula,154 then Congress must
fortify litigation-based remedies to challenge discriminatory
election changes. Specifically, it must compensate for
litigation’s central shortcoming: the possibility of illegal voting
schemes. In regards to litigation, Congress must act to lower
the standard for judges to grant preliminary injunctions and
create an expedited schedule for the hearing of VRA cases.155
The VRAA proposes such a change.156 This is a practical,
palatable, and constitutional reform. Moreover, such a reform
does not have to be undertaken at the expense of attempting to
148 Id. at 67 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96)).
149 Id. at 68 (quoting J. Gerald Hebert & Armand Defner, More Observations
on Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
(Mar. 1, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.clcblog.org/~clcblog1/index.php?view=article&id=
506%3Amore-observations-on-shelby-county-alabama-and-the-supreme-court-
&format=phocapdf&option=com_content (click for PDF)).
150 Id. at 68 (quoting Voting Rights Act after the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Shelby County: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 18, 2013) (testimony of Robert A.
Kengle), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/hear_07182013/
R%20Kengle%207-18-2013.pdf).
151 Levitt Testimony, supra note 86, at 105.
152 Stephanopoulos, supra note 83, at 68-69.
153 Id. at 64 (“There necessarily exist circumstances in which a plaintiff is
unable to satisfy its burden under Section 2 and, on the same facts, a jurisdiction is
unable to meet its burden under Section 5.”).
154 See supra Part II.
155 For a similar proposal that does not include an expedited court schedule,
see Stephanopoulos, supra note 83, at 122-25.
156 See S. 1945, 113th Cong. § 6 (2014).
248 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
revive preclearance, but it should be tackled separately from
noble but quixotic efforts to contrive a new constitutional
coverage formula.
B. Standard for Granting Preliminary Injunctions
The equitable power to grant a preliminary injunction
(or temporary restraining order) is drawn from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.157 While there is no uniform federal
standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, several
circuits use a four-part standard in reviewing a district court’s
discretion to grant a preliminary injunction.158 The standard is
(1) whether the plaintiff will probably succeed on the merits; (2)
whether irreparable harm to the plaintiff would result if the
injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of harms between the
plaintiff and defendant if the injunction is allowed; and (4) whether
the injunction will have an impact on the public interest.159
This standard, though, is not set in stone. “[T]he
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has the power to
override such equitable principles.”160
C. The Use of Preliminary Injunctions in Voting
Discrimination Cases and Analogous Uses
In two cases decided since the Shelby County decision,
as examples, both judges denied motions by voting rights
advocates for a preliminary injunction of a state’s Voter ID
law.161 First was a case in the Eastern District of Virginia162
involving a computer program which challenged what it found
to be duplicate registrants on the voting rolls.163 The second
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
158 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also U.S.
Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a
Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 497 (2003).
159 Denlow, supra note 158, at 497-98.
160 Samuel Bagenstos, The Preliminary Injunction Provision, in AM.
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW& POLICY, supra note12, at 12, 13.
161 Because the passing of and legal challenge to state Voter ID laws is a new and
rapidly changing landscape, this note does not purport to treat this issue comprehensively.
These are just examples that are illustrative of gaps in the current VRA scheme for
successful legal challenges that do not subject minority voters to illegal voting schemes.
162 Memorandum Opinion and Order, The Democratic Party of Va. v. Va.
State Bd. Of Elections, No. 1:13-cv-1218 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2013).
163 Matt Zapotosky, Virginia’s Democratic Party Loses Challenge Against
Purge of 38,000 Voters from Rolls, THEWASHINGTON POST.COM (Oct. 18, 2013),
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instance involved a challenge to North Carolina’s Voter ID law,
which is still ongoing despite the Judge’s recent denial of
minority voters’ request for a preliminary injunction.164 One
central problem in both rulings is both the difficulty of proving
concretely that the policy had discriminatory intent and that
individuals would actually be disenfranchised.
Courts have, however, used their discretion to grant a
preliminary injunction based on potential rather than concrete
harm to minority votes. In the lead-up to the 2008 Presidential
election, a Pennsylvania District Court found that
Pennsylvania’s election procedures, namely its long lines at
polling stations on election day, posed an undue burden on
individuals’ right to vote and granted a preliminary injunction.165
This was based on the potential harm to the individuals’ right to
vote on Election Day.166 Preliminary injunctions, then, can be a
remedy to prospective constitutional burdens on voting rights.
However, it can be improved with a statutory fix that lessens the
merits requirement for the grant of preliminary injunctions to
allow the potentiality of harm to minority voters to be of larger
consideration in the court’s determination.
Injunctive relief has been a successful remedy for other
policy areas where the irreparable harm to vulnerable
populations would be too great a cost to bear. For instance,
environmental law is an area where Congress’s broad statutory
grants of authority enabled courts to expand preliminary
equitable relief.167 Harm done to the environment can be
irreparable and, as a result, courts have greater power to use
preliminary injunctive relief where necessary.168 In TVA v. Hill,
the Court held that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) required
courts to exercise their equitable powers liberally when an
endangered habitat’s vitality is threatened.169 “[W]hen a court
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/federal-judge-rejects-democratic-
challenge-to-virginia-voter-roll-purge/2013/10/18/26235068-3809-11e3-8a0e-
4e2cf80831fc_story.html.
164 Memorandum Opinion and Order, N. C. NAACP v. McCrory, Case No.
1:13-cv-658 (2014), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/nc-
prelim-ruling.pdf.
165 NAACP State Conference of Pa. v. Cortes, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765, 767
(E.D. Pa. 2008).
166 For a comprehensive study of the legal issues surrounding challenging
election lines before Election Day, see Justin Levitt, Long Lines at the Courthouse: Pre-
Election Litigation of Election Day Burdens 9 ELECTION L. J. 19 (2010).
167 Eric R. Glitzenstein, Citizen Suits, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY
ANDPERSPECTIVES 260, 274 (Donald C. Baur &Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
168 See, e.g., Mfg. Chemists Ass’n v. Costle, 451 F. Supp. 902, 906 (W.D. La. 1978).
169 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
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discerns a likely violation of the ESA that poses the potential
for irreparable harm to a listed species, preliminary injunctive
relief will ordinarily be forthcoming.”170 Additionally, Congress
also created an automatic preliminary injunction with its stay-
put provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), where a school district cannot change a disabled
student’s individual education plan unilaterally “while due
process proceedings are pending.”171 In both situations,
Congress has used its legislative power to give courts more
discretion to grant preliminary injunctions. The common theme
in both is relaxing the success on the merits prong so courts
can focus on the potential irreparable harm posed. If drafting a
new coverage formula will prove constitutionally suspect,
alternative statutory amendments may be the best course of
action for the legislature.
D. The Preliminary Injunction Provision of the VRAA
The VRAA includes a provision that allows a court, in
voting rights cases, to “grant [preliminary injunctive relief] if
the court determines that, on balance, the hardship imposed
upon the defendant by the issuance of the relief will be less
than the hardship that would be imposed upon the plaintiff if
the relief were not granted.”172 In other words, the courts do not
have to look into the merits of a voting rights claim, per se, but
rather the potential hardships to the litigants when deciding
whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction.173 Such relief
can only be granted when there is a change in voting practice,
not when a complaint is filed against an existing election
procedure.174 This provision alone is a viable option for voting
rights advocates to use to combat discriminatory voting laws.
Its attachment to reviving a preclearance formula, though, is
both politically impalpable and constitutionally questionable.
E. Statutory Proposal
If Congress cannot draft a constitutionally viable
formula, then it must pass new legislation to avoid the problems
posed by illegal voting schemes. In the aftermath of Shelby
170 Glitzenstein, supra note 167, at 275.
171 Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 13 (citation omitted).
172 S. 1945, 113th Cong. § 6(b) (2014).
173 Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 12-13.
174 Id.
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County, litigation will be the primary vehicle for protecting
minority voting rights. Though there may still be hope that a
preclearance regime can be resuscitated by the bail-in approach
under Section 3(c), the future of preclearance itself is
constitutionally murky.175 Bail-in, additionally, still leaves
minority voting populations vulnerable to illegal voting schemes
while litigation is pending. Therefore, to avoid the irreparable
harm caused by illegal voting schemes, Congress must craft a
twofold statute that: 1) lowers the threshold for plaintiffs to
make a showing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction; and
2) creates a statutory schedule to expedite the hearing of VRA
cases prior to an election with a contested procedure.
First, Congress should adopt the VRAA Section 6, which
focuses more on a balance of the hardships analysis in voting
rights cases and moves away from the plaintiff’s burden to
show a likelihood of success on the merits. This would restore
the pre-Shelby County idea that jurisdictions, and not at-risk
minority voters, should bear the cost in challenging election
procedures by delaying the implementation of a potentially
discriminatory practice or procedure. Unlike a new coverage
formula, moreover, VRAA Section 6 does not face the
constitutional death knell of the equal sovereignty doctrine. It
is uniform in application across the states, thus heightened
scrutiny would not apply.
Second, Congress should require courts to expedite the
hearing of VRA cases when in close proximity to an election.
Such provisions would be triggered when the state or locality
enacts a policy less than 180 days prior to an election.176 The
expedited schedule would also be triggered when a decision on
the merits of a Section 2 case regarding a voting scheme has
not been made before the occurrence of an election cycle,
allowing for, at the very least, a hearing on the issue of the
preliminary injunction. This gives courts the incentive to
resolve Section 2 cases expeditiously, but does not cause
irreparable harm to plaintiffs if the courts fail to do so. It also
encourages all jurisdictions to make necessary changes to their
election laws, rather than ones that promise shortsighted
political gain or are racially motivated. Policymakers will be
wary of prolonged litigation for a policy whose implementation
will be delayed beyond an election cycle.
175 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
176 This time frame is similar to the notification requirements for states and
political subdivisions in the new draft of the VRAA. See supra Part II.B.
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This amendment, moreover, should be made separate
from any proposal to amend Section 4’s coverage formula. Not
only is a new formula constitutionally suspect, but a proposal that
brings back preclearance would be less popular than an act that is
uniform in application and simply allows for due process to take
its course. Moreover, the Court has expressed doubt that Section
5, the preclearance provision of the VRA, is unconstitutional
itself.177 So, for voting rights advocates, amending the preliminary
injunction standard in voting rights cases is a better investment,
of their political capital in the long term. If Congress can revive
the overwhelming support of the 2006 reauthorization, with near
unanimity in both houses,178 passing statutory amendments to
improve voter protection is not impossible.
CONCLUSION
Congress should not waste its efforts drafting a new
formula as the courts are likely to strike it down. The new
equal sovereignty doctrine is a departure from the rational
basis examination the Court uses to review Congress’s power to
enact the VRA. In future cases, a coverage formula that
burdens the equal sovereignty of the states will be subject to
some form of heightened scrutiny where the Court will examine
how a formula is tailored to current conditions of voter
discrimination. This standard is not only burdensome, but
likely fatal to the vitality of any new formula.
If the task of drafting a new coverage formula is in fact
a fool’s errand, then the search for a substitute for preclearance
will be in vain. Civil rights advocates must adjust to the idea
that preclearance is a vestige of the twentieth century and that
alternative legislative remedies will never be quite the same.
With that in mind, advocates ought to turn to constitutionally
viable and effective statutory amendments that seek to solve
the dire problem presented by illegal voting schemes. Congress
should look to the VRAA Section 6 as a model and lower the
threshold for plaintiffs to make a showing for preliminary
injunctive relief and provide for an expedited schedule to hear
VRA cases. Congress should also note in any amendment that
the intent of its new language is to avoid the irreparable harm
of illegal voting schemes.
177 See supra Part II.B.
178 Shelby Cnty. 133 S. Ct. at 2632.
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While the bail-in approach of Section 3(c) may be the
preferred method of the DOJ and civil rights advocates, it still has
many shortcomings. Bail-in still exposes minority populations to
irreparable harm through illegal voting schemes. With a
legislative scheme that makes preliminary injunctions more
available to plaintiffs, advocates can pursue legal challenges to
bail-in jurisdictions into preclearance without voters bearing the
cost of discrimination in illegal voting schemes. A more viable,
litigation-based approach that is bolstered by amendment’s to the
VRA goes beyond the pre-Shelby County VRA in preventing
illegal voting schemes because it would protect minority voters
in all jurisdictions, not simply in ones previously covered by
Section 4. Absent a constitutional amendment or a drastic
change in the composition of the Supreme Court, this is the
best avenue for VRA proponents hoping to shield minority
voters from irreparable harm.
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